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INTRODUCTION
It was 2004 and Laura Dunn was a freshman at the University of Madison-
Wisconsin. In April of that year, Dunn was socializing with friends and had become so
intoxicated that two of her male teammates offered to walk her safely to another party.
Instead, they took her to a nearby apartment and, one-by-one, raped her as she fell in
and out of consciousness.1 It took Dunn over a year to report the assault to university
officials and police.2 University officials then took nine months “to contemplate [and]
reject filing disciplinary charges”3 against the men “due to a lack of ‘clear and convinc-
ing’ evidence,”4 which was attributed “partially because Dunn reported her assault 15
months after it occurred.”5
* JD, William & Mary Law School, 2019; BA, Eckerd College, 2014. I would like to thank
every teacher who has ever instructed, influenced, and encouraged me to study and learn with
humility, grace, and fervor. I am beyond thankful to the Student Affairs staff at Eckerd College
who contributed to my professional development in higher education and gave me the grounding
I needed to explore this Note topic. Many thanks as well to the staff of the William & Mary Bill
of Rights Journal for their eagle-eye edits and thoughtful input; I am humbled to be among such
an inspiring class of citizen-lawyers. Finally, I am beside myself with gratitude as I write to thank
my parents for their insurmountable generosity and support. Your sacrifices and unwavering
commitment are the reasons for my success, and your unending love motivates me to change
the world.
1 Denise Restauri, This Law Grad Gets Justice For Survivors Of Campus Sexual Violence,
FORBES (Sept. 1, 2016, 9:22 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/deniserestauri/2016/09/01
/this-law-grad-gets-justice-for-survivors-of-campus-sexual-violence/#4327cbe77d39 [https://
perma.cc/2RPN-RDQG].
2 Tyler Kingkade, The Woman Students Call When They’ve Been Raped On Campus, BUZZ-
FEED NEWS (Feb. 9, 2017, 12:14 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/tylerkingkade/laura-dunns
-campus-rape-fight?utm_term=.dd59A84ZV#.dc0x2kzXL [https://perma.cc/GGK7-HDV2].
3 Kristin Jones, Lax Enforcement of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault Cases, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (last updated Mar. 26, 2015, 4:42 PM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010
/02/25/4374/lax-enforcement-title-ix-campus-sexual-assault-cases-0 [https://perma.cc/HV6G
-8G39] (“The university said a police investigation and the alleged victim’s objections to one
of her investigating officers accounted for the delay.”).
4 Taylor Harvey, Victim into Advocate: One Sexual Assault Survivor’s Fight for Justice,
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Dunn filed a complaint with the Department of Education’s Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) under Title IX,6 alleging a violation of her right to an education free
from sex-based discrimination.7 In 2008, OCR ruled in favor of the university,8
finding that its actions were appropriate and in accordance with “established law,
due-process guidelines, and victim-support standards.”9
But Dunn contends that “the ways the university handled her report would have
violated [those same] principles . . . had her assault occurred after April 4, 2011.”10
On that date, Vice President Joe Biden Jr. announced a set of “broad new federal
guidelines for how colleges should handle students’ reports of assault” in a twenty-
page letter released by OCR.11 The Dear Colleague Letter,12 as it has come to be
known, codified in detail how colleges and universities should investigate sexual
misconduct promptly and fairly in order to be in compliance with the federal gender-
equity law, Title IX.13 While it was intended to provide both educational institutions
and “members of the public with information about their rights,”14 its prominence
as a “significant guidance document”15 raised skepticism over university officials’
capabilities to properly and fairly adjudicate sexual violence.16
6 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1986). As part of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, Title IX
provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any edu-
cation program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id.
7 Kingkade, supra note 2.
8 Letter from Dawn R. Matthias, Team Leader, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil
Rights, to Laura Dunn (Aug. 6, 2008), http://web.archive.org/web/20101204021006/www
.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus_assault/assets/pdf/Laura_Dunn_OCR_finding.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8DCW-SURE].
9 Robin Wilson, How a 20-Page Letter Changed the Way Higher Education Handles




12 “Dear Colleague” Letter from Russlyn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t
of Educ., Office for Civil Rights (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/let
ters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YAZ-T24Z] [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter].
13 Id. at 1 (“Title IX and its implementing regulations . . . prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sex in education programs or activities operated by recipients of Federal financial
assistance. Sexual harassment of students, which includes acts of sexual violence, is a form
of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX.”).
14 Id. at 1 n.1.
15 Id.
16 See FIRE’s Guide to Due Process and Campus Justice, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS.
IN EDUC., https://www.thefire.org/first-amendment-library/special-collections/fire-guides/fires
-guide-to-due-process-and-campus-justice/fires-guide-to-due-process-and-fair-procedure-on
-campus-full-text/ [https://perma.cc/XS3K-MCUP] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) [hereinafter
FIRE’s Guide to Due Process].
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Such skeptics allege that conducting sexual misconduct hearings according to
the Dear Colleague Letter guidelines results in a violation of the accused’s constitu-
tional right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.17 In light
of the recent explosion of critical comparison between university disciplinary hearings
and criminal trials for the same or similar conduct, this Note stands in defense of the
university disciplinary process by offering a comparative analysis of university dis-
ciplinary hearings and American juries when it comes to examining, deliberating,
and reaching an outcome on sex-based misconduct.
This research and comparative analysis will show that universities are more
efficient at safeguarding principles of fundamental fairness for all parties than jury
trials are for the same kind of offense. This will be highlighted by drawing a com-
parison between the components of sexual misconduct disciplinary hearings and jury
trials for sex-based crimes. Ultimately, this will quell critics’ fears that an accused’s
due process rights are infringed when universities adjudicate claims of sexual mis-
conduct, and will show that the process is, on a micro-level, more efficient and reliable
for both the victim and accused than is currently the reality for both parties in criminal
jury trials.
Part I of this Note discusses the evolution of due process rights in university
disciplinary hearings and gives a general overview of universities’ obligations to stu-
dents as mandated by OCR. Part II focuses on the due process–related criticism of
the Dear Colleague Letter that led to its formal recission in 2016. This Note will
explore this criticism by delving into its main arguments, including the belief that
college administrators are ill-equipped to adjudicate sexual misconduct. Because this
Note seeks to refute this argument, Parts III, IV, and V compare the university disci-
plinary process to American juries rendering verdicts in trials for sex-based crimes.
Specifically, Part III compares the training methods for juries and college conduct
professionals. Part IV explores the effect of exposure for jurors and university
disciplinary professionals to show perspective on conduct and subsequent remedial
outcomes. Finally, Part V discusses the impact of being called for jury service as an
extracurricular civic duty versus the career-aspiring choice to become a college
conduct professional.
This Note concludes that there is greater expertise and efficiency in university
disciplinary hearings than in criminal jury trials thereby rebutting the criticism of
such hearings as a violation of students’ due process rights.
I. EVOLUTION OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
Until recently, due process rights for students at American institutions of higher
education were largely nonexistent, and punishment for student misconduct was left
17 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. See discussion infra Section IV.D (discussing life, liberty,
and property interest rights provided by the Fifth Amendment and made applicable to states
through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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at the whim of college administrators in loco parentis.18 In the watershed case of
Gott v. Berea College,19 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physi-
cal and moral welfare and mental training of the pupils, and we
are unable to see why, to that end, they may not make any rule
or regulation for the government or betterment of their pupils
that a parent could for the same purpose.20
With this understanding, institutions of higher education were armed with a license
to promulgate rules, and “students were seldom successful in challenging them in
the courts.”21 This doctrine began to deteriorate in the 1960s, when in loco parentis
was juxtaposed with a changing cultural attitude regarding adulthood.22 As college
campuses became a hotbed for political, social, and economic protests, it was only
fitting that the institutions themselves saw their own doctrinal paradigm in the
cultural movement’s crosshairs.23
A. The Death of In Loco Parentis and Birth of Due Process in University
Disciplinary Proceedings
In loco parentis “inevitably yielded to expanded concepts of individual liberties
for college students”24 when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sounded its death knell
in Dixon v. Alabama.25 In that case, the court set forth the groundwork for due process
rights for students enrolled in public colleges and universities.26 In Dixon, six
students orchestrated a sit-in as part of the Civil Rights movement at an off-campus
18 Literally meaning “in the absence of a parent,” in loco parentis refers to the relation-
ship between university administrators and students, wherein “[c]ollege authorities stood in
the place of parents to the students entrusted to their care.” Brian Jackson, The Lingering
Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 1135, 1136 (1991).
19 161 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913).
20 Id. at 206.
21 Britton White, Student Rights: From In Loco Parentis to Sine Parentibus and Back
Again? Understanding the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act in Higher Education,
2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 321, 325 (2007).
22 See id. (discussing how protests against the Vietnam War coincided with sociopolitical
changes, such as lowering the age of eligibility to vote).
23 See id. at 325–26.
24 Id. at 326.
25 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
26 See Lisa L. Swem, Due Process Rights in Student Disciplinary Matters, 14 J.C. & U.L.
359, 359 n.3 (1987) (“Because Dixon introduced constitutional safeguards into the area of
student discipline, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the case as a ‘landmark
decision.’”) (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577 n.8 (1975)).
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restaurant.27 Although the administrators at Alabama State College did not say so
explicitly,28 the students were expelled presumably as a result of their participation
in the protest.29 The students brought suit against the Alabama Board of Education
alleging a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.30
The court found that due process requires “notice and some opportunity for a
hearing before the students at a tax-supported college could be expelled for miscon-
duct.”31 It reasoned that, although there was no statute requiring such, the college
should have given notice and an opportunity for a hearing because it was in its usual
practice.32 “[N]otice,” the court wrote, “should contain a statement of the specific
charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion under the regulations
of the Board of Education.”33 Thus, the court reversed the college’s decision to expel
the students because they were not given notice of the college’s intention to bring
disciplinary proceedings against them, nor an opportunity to be heard at a judicial
hearing on the matter, actions the court held to be—at a minimum—required to
comport with procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.34
However, “the vagueness of procedural due process concepts stated in Dixon
engendered confusion among the lower courts as to the application of these selected
constitutional principles,”35 and courts in the late 1960s began to shift back and forth
between giving deference to university disciplinary decisions and expressing con-
cern for due process rights for students.36 Finally, the Eighth Circuit weighed in with
its ruling in Esteban v. Central Missouri State College,37 clarifying the role of the
27 See Dixon, 294 F.2d at 152–54.
28 Id. at 151–52 (“The notice of expulsion . . . mailed to each of the plaintiffs assigned
no specific ground for expulsion, but referred in general terms to ‘this problem of Alabama
State College.’”). Alabama State College is now Alabama State University. See 149 Years
of Leadership, ALA. ST. UNIV., http://www.alasu.edu/about-asu/history--tradition/149-years
-of-leadership/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/H9KW-6HES] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
29 See Dixon, 294 F.2d at 152–54.
30 Id. at 151 n.1.
31 Id. at 151.
32 Id. at 155.
33 Id. at 158.
34 See id. at 158–59. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Dixon was followed by other successful
challenges brought by students against institutions for violations of due process, including
sanctions imposed. See, e.g., Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1969) (“[E]xpul-
sion and prolonged suspension may not be imposed on students by a university simply on the
basis of allegations of ‘misconduct’ without reference to any preexisting rule which supplies
an adequate guide.”).
35 Elizabeth L. Grossi & Terry D. Edwards, Student Misconduct: Historical Trends in
Legislative and Judicial Decision-Making in American Universities, 23 J.C. & U.L. 829, 835
(1997).
36 Id. at 836.
37 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
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judiciary in recognizing substantive and procedural due process in university dis-
ciplinary hearings.38 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that “procedural due process
must be afforded” in accordance with the principles set forth in Dixon.39 Further, the
court stressed that “school regulations are not to be measured by the standards which
prevail for . . . criminal procedure; and that courts should interfere only where there
is a clear case of constitutional infringement.”40
The Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez41 expanded on this sentiment, noting that
any increased judicial intervention in academic affairs that “formaliz[es] the suspen-
sion process and escalat[es] its formality and adversary nature may not only make
it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part
of the teaching process.”42 Despite this, the Court extended the Dixon due process
requirements to outcomes involving short suspensions, confined to public high
school students, and “ventured that ‘more formal procedures’ may be required for
longer suspensions or dismissals.”43 Still, the accused must “be given oral or written
notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evi-
dence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.”44 At
a minimum, universities must engage in an “informal give-and-take” with a student
before imposing a penalty; allowing this “will provide a meaningful hedge against
erroneous action.”45
Due process protection, as a general matter, continued to evolve in Mathews v.
Eldrige,46 which set forth a three-part balancing test to see what particular pro-
tections are required in a given situation.47 The Court held that comporting with
procedural due process requires weighing the private interest that will be affected
by action taken; the risk of error and the value of additional protection; and what
additional burdens would entail for governmental interest.48 This test is applied when
weighing student interests with the state’s interests. Thus, procedural due process
at colleges and universities seems largely born out of case law.
38 See id. at 1089. Although not a central focus of this Note, the courts have formally
recognized substantive due process in college conduct proceedings. See id. (“We do hold that
a college has the inherent power to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has the inherent
power properly to discipline . . . that it may expect that its students adhere to generally
accepted standards of conduct . . . .”).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1090.
41 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
42 Id. at 583.
43 Swem, supra note 26, at 360 (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 584).
44 Goss, 419 U.S. at 581.
45 Id. at 583, 584.
46 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
47 Id. at 334–35.
48 Id. at 335.
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B. Due Process as Related to University Obligations Under Title IX
This type of court-only influence over procedural due process formally changed
in 1997 when the United States Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights
(OCR) published “Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School
Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties.”49 Then, in 2001, OCR published a
revised guidance to focus “on a school’s fundamental compliance responsibilities
under Title IX and the Title IX regulations to address sexual harassment of students
as a condition of continued receipt of Federal funding.”50
This remained the standard guidance until OCR passed the 2011 Dear Colleague
Letter, laying out federal expectations for due process in college Title IX–related
cases.51 The purpose of the Dear Colleague Letter was to provide guidance to public
schools and universities on adjudicating sexual misconduct and to clarify due
process in regard to the administrators’ responsibilities.52 Among its requirements
was the use of the preponderance of evidence as the standard of proof for Title IX
cases.53 The Dear Colleague Letter reasoned that this was consistent with the
Supreme Court and OCR’s evidentiary standard for civil and civil rights lawsuits.54
Using higher standards of proof, such as the “clear and convincing” standard that
requires more than a preponderance but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” was
deemed not equitable because they are “inconsistent with the standard of proof
established for violations of the civil rights laws . . . .”55 Additionally, it provided
that the typical time frame for investigating, adjudicating, and issuing an outcome
to a Title IX complaint was sixty days,56 which would effectively place universities
49 62 Fed. Reg. 12034 (Mar. 13, 1997).
50 See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance:
Harassment of Students By School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties (Jan. 2001),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/TMZ9-6T7A]
[hereinafter 2001 Guidance].
51 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 12. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1986).
52 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 12, at 1–2.
53 Id. at 10–11.
54 Id. (“The Supreme Court has applied a preponderance of the evidence standard in civil
litigation involving discrimination under Title VII . . . . Like Title IX, Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex. OCR also uses a preponderance of the evidence standard
when it resolves complaints against recipients. For instance, OCR’s Case Processing Manual
requires that a noncompliance determination be supported by the preponderance of the
evidence when resolving allegations of discrimination under all the statutes enforced by
OCR, including Title IX.”).
55 Id. at 11.
56 See id. at 12. Although investigations taking longer than sixty days may not be deemed
reasonably prompt, “[w]hether OCR considers complaint resolutions to be timely, however,
will vary depending on the complexity of the investigation and the severity and extent of the
harassment.” Id. See also U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Questions and Answers
on Title IX and Sexual Violence 31 (Apr. 29, 2014), https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/re
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in OCR’s crosshairs for investigative practices dragging on for months or even years,
as was formerly a common occurrence.57
Such bold oversight and direction came as a surprise to colleges and universi-
ties, which scrambled to ensure compliance with the Dear Colleague Letter’s
extensive directives.58 However, such surprise should elicit little sympathy; the Dear
Colleague Letter’s roots stretched back over decades of Supreme Court decisions
and subsequent actions by OCR to frame Title IX as a law providing for equal
opportunity, not just in college sports but as protection against gender-based vio-
lence.59 For instance, in 1995, OCR found that Evergreen College violated Title IX
when it failed to “‘promptly and equitably’ resolve a student’s complaint” and “by
using a higher standard of proof than it should have” to determine the accused’s
responsibility.60 That OCR explicitly echoed what it later codified in the Dear Col-
league Letter effectively gave colleges sixteen years’ notice as to what obligations
they had when investigating and adjudicating cases of sexual misconduct.61
In 2003, OCR again reiterated its recommended standard of evidence (prepon-
derance of the evidence) when it investigated the mishandling of a rape complaint
at Georgetown University.62 While OCR was by no means hiding or even implicity
stating these standards, “[b]y 2010 many colleges and universities lacked clear
grievance procedures to resolve students’ complaints . . . [they] took months to
investigate students’ reports” and continued to use “a higher standard of evidence
for sexual harassment and assault.”63 “Despite very clear case law that sexual
harassment and sexual assault were on a continuum and should be treated the same
sources/questions-and-answers-title-ix-and-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc /FEW9-BHSJ]
(follow “http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix .pdf” hyperlink)
[hereinafter Q&A] (“Although this timeframe does not include appeals, a school should be
aware that an unduly long appeals process may impact whether the school’s response was
prompt and equitable as required by Title IX.”).
57 See Wilson, supra note 9; see also Letter from Alice B. Wender, Reg. Office Dir., U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, to Teresa Sullivan, President of the University of
Virginia 12 (Sept. 21, 2015) (concluding UVA did not schedule a Title IX hearing for five
months); Jones, supra note 3.
58 Margo Vanover Porter, Title IX Coordinators Learning to Cope With ‘Dear Colleague’
Letter, EDURISK (Mar. 2014), https://www.edurisksolutions.org/Templates/template-article
.aspx?id=2147483767&pageid=136 [https://perma.cc/WFN3-5EF2].
59 See Wilson, supra note 9.
60 Id.
61 See id. The Dear Colleague Letter’s production in 2011 came sixteen years after OCR
ruled in the Evergreen College case in 1995; thus, colleges were on notice during those
sixteen years as to what OCR expected of them when it came to equitable procedures and the
appropriate standard of proof.
62 Id. See also Letter from Sheralyn Goldbecker, Team Leader, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
Office for Civil Rights, to Dr. John DeGioia 3 (May 5, 2004), https://www.ncherm.org/doc
uments/199-GeorgetownUniversity--11032017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RC8-3HUM].
63 Wilson, supra note 9.
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under Title IX, higher education didn’t really understand this until the [Dear Col-
league Letter].”64
Administrators struggled with “untangling the web of related legal obligations”
arising from the Dear Colleague Letter’s directives and how it intersected with other
legislative obligations.65 In 2014, the Department of Education produced the Questions
and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence (Q&A) to “clarify the legal require-
ments and guidance articulated in the Dear Colleague Letter and the 2001 Guidance
and include examples of proactive efforts schools can take to prevent sexual violence
and remedies schools may use to end such conduct, prevent its recurrence, and
address its effects.”66
An important component of the Q&A document is the requirement that “[a]ll
persons involved in implementing a recipient’s grievance procedures . . . must have
training or experience in handling complaints of sexual harassment and sexual
violence . . . .”67 In defending this component of the Dear Colleague Letter, advo-
cates recommend that OCR go a step further and include training specifically on
evaluating cases based on a preponderance of the evidence standard, how to deter-
mine credibility, and the effects of trauma.68
II. CRITICISM OF THE DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER
Despite the Dear Colleague Letter’s approval among women’s rights and victim’s
advocacy groups, it was met with considerable criticism by a vast array of others,
ranging from so-called men’s rights groups to Ivy League law school faculty.69 The
criticism of the Dear Colleague Letter for purposes of this Note will focus primarily
on complaints related to due process for the accused, namely concerns with the Dear
Colleague Letter’s requisite evidentiary standard, its guarantee that the accuser has
the right to appeal, and its discouragement of cross-examination.70 Because these are
64 Id.
65 Porter, supra note 58.
66 Q&A, supra note 56, at 2.
67 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 12, at 12. See also Q&A, supra note 56, at 40.
68 See, e.g., Sarah Edwards, The Case in Favor of OCR’s Tougher Title IX Policies:
Pushing Back Against the Pushback, 23 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 121, 140–41 (2015).
69 See, e.g., David Rudovsky et al., Open Letter from Members of the Penn Law School
Faculty: Sexual Assault Complaints: Protecting Complainants and the Accused Students at
Universities, PHILLY.COM (Feb. 18, 2015), http://media.philly.com/documents/OpenLetter
.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9ZT-RLF5]. See generally Bethy Squires, Survivors of Campus Rape
Plead with DeVos to Protect Their Rights, BROADLY (July 14, 2017, 1:31 PM), https://
broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/vbmpjm/survivors-of-campus-rape-plead-with-devos-to-keep
-protecting-their-rights [https://perma.cc/6UYV-JWS9] (discussing a July 13, 2017, meeting
of Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos with rape survivors and those groups, including
men’s rights organizations, who felt the sexual assault investigations on campus were biased
against the accused).
70 It should be noted, however, that this is not an exhaustive list of criticisms voiced by
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among critics’ most prominent concerns with the Dear Colleague Letter, this Note
will consider them the basic foundational arguments to disprove, showing instead
that universities that adjudicate college conduct hearings in accordance with the
principles set forth in the Dear Colleague Letter effectuate a robust defense of
protections for students’ due process rights.
A. The Preponderance of Evidence Standard Is Inappropriate
Primarily, the Dear Colleague Letter’s requirement that sexual misconduct cases
be adjudicated in accordance with the preponderance of evidence standard of proof
gives critics cause for concern because its rationale does not conform to the reality
of what college conduct hearings are,71 and is “simply too low for what is at stake
for the accused student.”72 As mentioned previously,73 the Dear Colleague Letter
requires this evidentiary standard because this is used in all civil and civil rights
cases; however, critics charge that defendants in civil trials “have their hearings con-
ducted by experienced and impartial judges” who are familiar with how to weigh
evidence accordingly.74 Indeed, the implicit skepticism of administrator expertise
forms much of the criticism surrounding the use of the preponderance standard.75
Additionally, critics opine that the Dear Colleague Letter lowered the eviden-
tiary standard that colleges had been using traditionally, and consequently reneged on
the 2001 Guidance by stripping colleges of any flexibility in how to weigh the evi-
dence.76 The 2001 Guidance acknowledged that “[p]rocedures adopted by schools will
vary considerably in detail, specificity, and components, reflecting differences in
audiences, school sizes and administrative structures, State or local legal requirements,
opponents to the Dear Colleague Letter. See, e.g., Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment
for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L.
REV. 49 (2013).
71 See, e.g., Ryan D. Ellis, Mandating Injustice: The Preponderance of the Evidence Man-
date Creates a New Threat to Due Process on Campus, 32 REV. LITIG. 65, 80–81 (2013). See
Standard of Evidence Survey: Colleges and Universities Respond to OCR’s New Mandate,
FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (Oct. 28, 2011), https://www.thefire.org/standard-of
-evidence-survey-colleges-and-universities-respond-to-ocrs-new-mandate/#_ftnref8 [https://
perma.cc/465N-DE6H] (contrasting civil trials with college conduct hearings).
72 Tamara Rice Lave, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication: Why Universities Should
Reject the Dear Colleague Letter, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 915, 957 (2016) (“Although a student
will not go to jail . . . the student’s life will almost certainly still be gravely affected.”).
73 See supra Section I.B.
74 See FIRE’s Guide to Due Process, supra note 16 (“[T]he use of this low burden of proof
in federal civil cases is counterbalanced by the many procedural safeguards provided . . .
safeguards that aren’t present in campus cases.”).
75 See, e.g., id. (“[F]airly determining whether an accused student is guilty of sexual
assault requires skills beyond the university’s competence—the ability to gather and analyze
forensic evidence, for example.”).
76 Id.
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and past experience.”77 In explicitly ruling out other standards of proof to be used in
sexual misconduct hearings, the Dear Colleague Letter revoked a college’s discretion
to ensure due process safeguards proportionate to the gravity of the charged offense.78
B. Accuser’s Automatic Right to Appeal Violates Due Process
Critics also point out concerns with the Dear Colleague Letter’s expectation that
colleges provide a reporting party with the right to appeal if the same right is afforded
to the responding party.79 This, critics argue, would require the accused to invest
additional time, energy, and money to defend themselves for a second or subsequent
time, causing them to relive the stress and trauma of the initial hearing.80 In a criminal
law context, the responding party may face a situation akin to “double jeopardy,”
whereby he or she faces the same charges for the same offense despite proper ad-
judication and subsequent acquittal.81
This recommendation further exacerbates the problems associated with the
evidentiary standard by allowing the reporting party a second bite at an apple seen
already as the too-low-hanging fruit.82 Also, it could give the hearing administrators
the proverbial second chance at bat, where they may feel compelled to reverse the
original findings out of pressure to return a desired but unfounded verdict.83 This can
be connected to the stigma associated with the offense, which may create an aura of
suspicion around the responding party and make it difficult for him or her to receive
an impartial hearing.84 Finally, the varying appellate procedures at different universi-
ties means that the uniform rule that guarantees the reporting party’s right to appeal
may take on different heads, depending on whether a college’s appellate procedures
include single appeals officers or full appellate committees.85 Such variability
weighs against the responding party because the process associated with these
appeals is not uniform among all colleges and universities.86
77 2001 Guidance, supra note 50, at 20.
78 FIRE’s Guide to Due Process, supra note 16.
79 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 12, at 12 (“OCR also recommends that schools
provide an appeals process. If a school provides for appeal of the findings or remedy, it must
do so for both parties.”).
80 See Lave, supra note 72, at 937–38; FIRE’s Guide to Due Process, supra note 16.
81 KC Johnson & Stuart Taylor, The Path to Obama’s ‘Dear Colleague’ Letter, WASH.
POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01
/31/the-path-to-obamas-dear-colleague-letter/?utm_term=.1b2b5e653e79 [https://perma.cc
/6RQ6-8XXU] (“The letter required universities to allow accusers to appeal not-guilty
findings, a form of double jeopardy.”).
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C. Discouraging Cross-Examination Violates Due Process
“The right to cross-examine witnesses generally has not been considered an es-
sential requirement of due process in school disciplinary proceedings.”87 The Dear
Colleague Letter regards cross-examination in college sexual misconduct hearings
as problematic, noting that its use may be traumatic or intimidating for the reporting
party “thereby possibly escalating or perpetuating a hostile environment.”88 As a
result, it “strongly discourages” colleges from allowing parties to cross-examine or
personally question one another.89 However, critics lament this limitation because of
the power of cross-examination to elicit evidence related to witness credibility, a
factor overwhelmingly at issue in sexual misconduct cases.90 Cross-examination holds
considerable importance in the litigation sphere and has even been regarded as the
“greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”91 Although not re-
quired as a protected right to due process in college conduct hearings,92 some courts
have held that it may be necessary in the event of a “he said, she said” situation.93
It should be noted, however, that the Dear Colleague Letter only “strongly
discourages schools from allowing the parties personally to question or cross-
examine each other during the hearing.”94 The 2014 Q&A document clarifies that:
A school may choose, instead, to allow the parties to submit
questions to a trained third party (e.g., the hearing panel) to ask
the questions on their behalf. OCR recommends that the third
party screen the questions submitted by the parties and only ask
those it deems appropriate and relevant to the case.95
Critics argue, however, that this fails to serve as an adequate substitute for the
inherently effective method and use of cross-examination, which elicits information
87 Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1972).
88 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 12, at 12.
89 Id.
90 See Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 641 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If [a] case . . .
resolve[s] itself into a problem of credibility, cross-examination of witnesses might . . . be[ ]
essential to a fair hearing.” (quoting Winnick, 460 F.2d at 550)).
91 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
§ 1367 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)).
92 See Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961).
93 See Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 401–02, 406–07 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding
that the responding party was entitled to cross-examination when credibility of the parties
was the main issue and the reporting party did not participate in the hearing). See also Winnick
v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549–50 (2d Cir. 1972).
94 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 12, at 12.
95 Q&A, supra note 56, at 31.
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from witnesses in a setting without allowing them the opportunity to sculpt responses
or cater them to a less-than-authentic purpose.96 Proponents of cross-examination
in sexual misconduct hearings argue that it can be controlled or limited in various
ways, such as physically separating the parties and banning irrelevant questions per-
taining to sexual history, but the current guidance falls short of affording the responding
party the opportunity to extract effective cross-examination.97 At a minimum, pro-
ponents suggest that the third party to whom the cross-examination questions are
submitted must “not be allowed to reject certain questions out of hand without
clearly stated and objectively reasonable grounds for doing so.”98
D. The 2017 Rescindment of the Dear Colleague Letter
On September 22, 2017, the Department of Education announced that it was
rescinding both the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and 2014 Q&A documents, citing
concerns with due process and a lack of public comment during their implementa-
tion.99 The rescindment lamented that the documents, though well-intentioned, “led
to the deprivation of rights for many students—both accused students denied fair
process and victims denied an adequate resolution of their complaints.”100 The
Department plans to implement a replacement policy after an opportunity for public
comment, an aspect it noted as missing from the Dear Colleague Letter and Q&A
document, and notes that it will no longer rely on these withdrawn documents
during its enforcement of Title IX.101
As support for its position, the letter discusses various substantive issues with
the Dear Colleague Letter that result in violations of due process and fundamental
fairness.102 Prominent among these concerns was that the Dear Colleague Letter
“required schools to adopt a minimal standard of proof—the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard—in administering student discipline, even though many schools
had traditionally employed a higher clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.”103
Implicit in this document is the skepticism with which committees reach their de-
cision and upon what evidence it was based. Yet, when making its decision, commit-
tees are entitled to considerable latitude, so long as it is not “arbitrary and capricious.”104
96 See FIRE’s Guide to Due Process, supra note 16.
97 See Rudovsky et al., supra note 69, at 4.
98 FIRE’s Guide to Due Process, supra note 16.
99 See Letter from Candice Jackson, Acting Ass’t Sec’y of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., Office of Civil Rights (Sep. 22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/let
ters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7T8-7LU9].
100 Id. at 1–2.
101 See id. at 2.
102 See id. at 1–2.
103 Id. at 1.
104 Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, an appellate court must, when reviewing
a government agency’s informal resolution of a question of fact, “hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
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In Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing,105 the Supreme Court “set a rigid
standard to determine arbitrary and capricious behavior.”106 The Court rendered the
decision valid “unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic
norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually
exercise professional judgment.”107
III. TRAINING AND EDUCATION FOR ADJUDICATING SEX-BASED CRIMES
Analyzing the differences between juries in trials for sex-based crimes and
college sexual misconduct hearings requires a closer look at who each respective
trier of fact is, how they are trained to evaluate the facts, and how they reach their
conclusion based on those facts. This Part will argue that pervasive bias and failure
to control for such bias due to lack of education and training makes the American
jury more prone to inequitable outcomes than the college sexual misconduct hearing
committee. In contrast, the legacy of the Dear Colleague Letter resulted in a cultural
norm among higher education institutions that disciplinary hearing professionals be
trained on how to understand the nature of the incidents that come before them, as
well as on the investigative process.108 Organizations that promote comprehensive
training offer a vast array of sensitivity, substance abuse, and evidentiary training
modules for colleges and universities, creating a cultural expectation in the profes-
sion that conduct professionals operate according to best practices.109 This Part will
conclude with a case study from Lewis & Clark College, which will show a practical
and ideal training system that would effectuate the goals of Title IX adjudication and
enforcement without threatening due process rights.
A. Pervasive Rape Myths Among American Juries Threaten an Equitable Outcome
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for the right
to be tried by “an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed.”110 Although not explicitly required, it is commonly understood that
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .” Administrative Procedure Act
§ 10(e)(B)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
105 106 S. Ct. 507 (1985).
106 Swem, supra note 26, at 362.
107 Ewing, 106 S. Ct. at 513.
108 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 12, at 4, 6, 7–8, 12.
109 See, e.g., Association for Student Conduct Administration, ASCA 2014 White Paper:
Student Conduct Administration & Title IX: Gold Standard Practices for Resolution of Alle-
gations of Sexual Misconduct on College Campuses (2014), http://www.theasca.org/files
/Publications/ASCA%202014%20Gold%20Standard.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2SU-HQC8]
(last visited Oct. 15, 2018); Association of Title IX Administrators, Training & Certification
from ATIXA, https://atixa.org/events/training-and-certification/ [https://perma.cc/LQ8M-SU6H]
(last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
110 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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this relates to a trial by ordinary citizens from one’s community, or in simple terms,
one’s peers.111 This coveted aspect of the American legal system carries with it the
assumption that one’s peers ought not be triers of fact, but should be because they
too live in the same community with the same expectations of behavior.112 However,
this can also spell out difficulties for both defendants and victims alike if the crime
alleged to have been committed is particularly nuanced and culturally stigmatized,
such as sexual assault.
Numerous studies analyze juror behavior, including how jurors decide cases,
analyze evidence, and regard the facts in light of their understanding of the law.113
In adult sexual assault cases, jurors tend to consider sexual assault in terms of a
victim’s assumption of the risk, rather than viewing it in light of the nonconsensual
sexual battery that it is.114 Personal perception of who the victim is, as well as her
character and lifestyle, are weighed as a significant factor for jurors deciding sexual
assault cases.115 This mentality leads jurors away from the behavior of the accused
and toward the behavior of the accuser, placing the culpability of the act not on the
actor but on the acted.116
Although such beliefs are pervasive in society as a cultural principle, they
become increasingly worrisome when they enter the deliberation room. In one study,
thirty-two percent of jurors believed that a woman’s resistance was a critical factor
in determining a rapist’s culpability, and fifty-nine percent of jurors believed that
a woman should do everything she could to repel her attacker.117 These beliefs
111 See James J. Gobert, Criminal Law: In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 269, 277–78 (1988).
112 See Lewis H. LaRue, A Jury of One’s Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 867 (1976)
(describing peers as “those who have enough in common with the accused, or who have
enough sympathy for the accused, to be able to give a realistic evaluation of his story”).
113 See National Judicial Education Program, Jury Selection and Decision Making in Adult
Victim Sexual Assault Cases (2011), http://www.legalmomentum.org/jury-selection-and-de
cision-making-adult-victim-sexual-assault-cases [https://perma.cc/JN8C-PDY6] [hereinafter
Judicial Education Program].
114 See LYNDA L. HOLMSTROM & ANN W. BURGESS, THE VICTIM OF RAPE: INSTITUTIONAL
REACTIONS 169 (1983) (citing HENRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 254
(1966)).
115 See Amy Grubb & Emily Turner, Attribution of Blame in Rape Cases: A Review of the
Impact of Rape Myth Acceptance, Gender Role Conformity and Substance Use on Victim
Blaming, 17 AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 443, 444 (2012) (internal citations omit-
ted) (“There are a number of variables which have been found to influence the degree to which
blame is allocated to the victim of a crime, including perceiver’s beliefs, victim charac-
teristics and situational aspects. Attribution of blame by observers of rape cases is therefore
subject to an infinite number of fluctuating variables which are likely to influence every
situation in a unique and unpredictable manner.”).
116 See id. at 444–45.
117 See Judicial Education Program, supra note 113, at 6 (citing GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (1989)).
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persist despite the fact that laws in many states do not require a woman to resist the
perpetrator.118 Thus, the power of societal myths regarding sexual assault naturally finds
its way to the jury deliberation room, propagating a dangerous cycle of victim-blaming
behavior. In one study, researchers found that “the more participants endorsed rape
myths, the less credible . . . and more blameworthy . . . they found the [victim].”119
To combat this, courts use voir dire to weed out any surface-level bias pertain-
ing to sexual assault.120 Juror identity plays a large role in how lawyers and judges
discern this bias.121 For example, research has found that stronger personal beliefs
in guilt were associated with “higher levels of education,” “positive attitudes toward
rape victims in general,” “higher perceptions of [victim] credibility,” and “low em-
pathy with the defendant.”122 These factors suggest that socioeconomic status may
be determinative in the likelihood of ascertaining these personal beliefs, but it is not
out of the realm of possibility to train jurors how to view evidence in a similar light
despite the absence of educational and environmental opportunities to develop these
tendencies. Indeed, “[i]f jurors were to receive the level of training and awareness-
raising necessary to challenge the deep-rooted and highly persuasive myths about
rape, the jury system would be more effective in dealing with sex crimes.”123
Additionally, any below-surface-level bias that is not detected and dispelled
prior to selection is meant to be remedied by jury instructions, which seek to control
for harmful sex-based bias prior to the actual decision-making.124 Such instructions
can be tailored to the offense, and may include advisement on circumstances unique
to the trial that give cause for concern, such as the jury’s treatment of prior sexual
behavior.125 Despite the best efforts of judges and counsel in crafting instructions to
118 See Rape and Resistance, BALTIMORE SUN (Feb. 13, 2017, 2:13 PM), http://www.balti
moresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-rape-20170213-story.html [https://perma.cc/NT5F
-RDRG] (“For decades, states have been updating the definition of ‘rape’ to move away from
its patriarchal past, which emphasized whether a victim demonstrated physical resistance.”).
119 Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, Complainant Sexual History Evidence: Its
Impact on Mock Jurors’ Decisions, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 252, 257 (2002).
120 See Christopher Mallios & Toolsi Meisner, Educating Juries in Sexual Assault Cases:
Part I: Using Voir Dire to Eliminate Jury Bias, 2 STRATEGIES 1, 2 (July 2010), http://www
.aequitasresource.org/educatingjuriesinsexualassaultcasespart1.pdf [https://perma.cc/25HF
-HBXG].
121 See Natalie Taylor, Juror Attitudes and Biases in Sexual Assault Cases, 344 TRENDS
& ISSUES IN CRIME & CRIM. JUST. 1, 4–5 (2007).
122 Id. at 4.
123 Julie Bindel, Juries Have No Place at Rape Trials—Victims Deserve Unprejudiced
Justice, GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2016, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree
/2016/aug/12/juries-no-place-rape-trials-victims-deserve-unprejudiced-justice-judge [https://
perma.cc/YHY7-Q8JM].
124 See J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L.
REV. 71, 85 (1990) (discussing a study finding that “giving a cautionary instruction concern-
ing rape victims significantly affected jurors’ decisions”).
125 See id. at 76–78 (discussing the two main varieties of admonitions—complete disregard
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limit the use of certain evidence in this regard or guide deliberations based on
applicable law, researchers found that “the proposed safeguard of providing jurors
with limiting instructions may be ineffective in curbing the pernicious impact of [the
victim’s] prior history evidence.”126 Thus, instructions directing jurors to shelve their
biases do not adequately counter the danger of jurors continuing to follow their
presumptions about victim behavior.127
Additionally, jurors’ opinions regarding the use of alcohol in sexual assault
cases is problematic when determining credibility, and often manifests itself in
detrimental ways to the victim while excusing the behavior of the accused.128 During
a study of jurors faced with sexual assault cases involving excessive intoxication,
researchers found that jurors often used intoxication to blame victims and absolve
perpetrators.129 Additionally, victims who were sober at the time of the rape were
perceived as more credible, leading to a greater conviction rate in those cases than
in cases where the victim was intoxicated.130 Therefore, juries are heavily influenced
by alcohol use during sexual assaults,131 often leading them to delineate from their
duty to judge the actions of the accused according to the applicable statute.
Finally, jurors are less likely to grasp the burden of proof as an objective, legal
matter, and are not adequately trained on how to weigh evidence when reaching a
verdict.132 “Even in real criminal prosecutions, jurors find it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to acquit a defendant they believe to be guilty, even if proof wasn’t beyond a
reasonable doubt. The human desire for fairness compels us to go with the odds,
even if the technical burden is otherwise.”133 While jury instructions and closing
of information and instructions limiting the use of evidence—which prevent jurors from mis-
using potentially harmful information, such as past criminal behavior).
126 Schuller & Hastings, supra note 119, at 259.
127 See Tanford, supra note 124, at 86 (“Admonishing jurors often provokes the opposite
of the intended effect.”).
128 See generally Emily Finch & Vanessa E. Munro, Juror Stereotypes and Blame
Attribution in Rape Cases Involving Intoxicants: The Findings of a Pilot Study, 45 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 25 (2005) (detailing a study focused on the intersection between jurors’ attribu-
tions of blame and responsibility and common conceptions concerning alcohol and drugs).
129 See id. at 35–36 (“[T]here was a surprising level of condemnation for victims of rape
who were intoxicated, even in situations in which their drinks had been interfered with
without their knowledge . . . . These views were accompanied by a general inclination to
ascribe responsibility for intercourse to the intoxicated victim unless there was clear evidence
of wrongdoing on behalf of the defendant.”).
130 See Ashley A. Wenger & Brian H. Bornstein, The Effects of Victim’s Substance Use
and Relationship Closeness on Mock Jurors’ Judgments in an Acquaintance Rape Case, 54
SEX ROLES 547, 547 (2006).
131 See id. at 552.
132 See Scott H. Greenfield, Will Raising the Burden of Proof Fix Title IX?, SIMPLE JUSTICE
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://blog.simplejustice.us/2017/08/02/will-raising-the-burden-of-proof-fix
-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/S5UY-Y5XK] (“People don’t really ‘get’ how standards function.”).
133 Id.
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arguments are intended to clarify the burden of proof required for conviction, jurors
with little or no background in evaluating evidence are left to deliberate without any
check to their emotional predispositions.134 Ultimately, research has given some jus-
tification to the concern that “defendants face the prospect of an unfair trial simply
by virtue of being unlucky in the characteristics of the jurors drawn from the jury
pool on the day of the trial.”135
B. Required Training for University Hearing Professionals Results in Fair
Deliberations and Equitable Outcomes136
In contrast, college sexual misconduct hearing professionals (“hearing profes-
sionals”) receive training to combat unfair prejudices and are often educated on
alcohol use during sexual assault cases.137 This training is comprehensive and
includes sensitivity toward victims, evaluating the preponderance of the evidence
standard, and determining consent.138 There are a number of organizations that assist
colleges with training their employees to be compliant with Title IX and cognizant
of their obligations under the college’s own policies and procedures.139 These
organizations are run by former or current hearing officers as well as legal profes-
sionals.140 Under this umbrella, every college has the opportunity to connect with and
receive guidance from professionals in the same community, allowing them to ex-
change ideas for best practices.
The identity of hearing officers is inherently different than that of the average
American jury. Professional hearing officers at colleges typically have an advanced
degree, either at the Master’s or Juris Doctor level.141 At a minimum, professional
134 See id.
135 Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann & Jeremy Blair Smith, A Multidimensional Examination of Jury
Composition, Trial Outcomes, and Attorney Preferences 5 (June 27, 2013) (working paper)
(retrieved from http://www.uh.edu/~jlehman2/papers/lehmann_smith_jurycomposition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HR5S-2N6B]).
136 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 12 (“All persons involved in implementing a
recipient’s grievance procedures (e.g., Title IX coordinators, investigators, and adjudicators)
must have training or experience in handling complaints of sexual harassment and sexual
violence . . . .”).
137 See, e.g., Association of Student Conduct Administrators, ASCA 2014 White Paper:
Student Conduct Administration & Title IX: Gold Standard Practices for Resolution of Allega-
tions of Sexual Misconduct on College Campuses 28(2014), http://www.theasca.org/files
/Publications/ASCA%202014%20Gold%20Standard.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK8R-M742].
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., id.; Association of Title IX Administrators, Training & Certification from
ATIXA, https://atixa.org/events/training-and-certification/ [https://perma.cc/VU6K-L4Q7] (pro-
viding several levels of certification to include Title IX Coordinator Certification Training).
140 See generally Association of Title IX Administrators, https://atixa.org/ [https://perma
.cc/E3JG-8RBQ]; NASPA, https://www.naspa.org/ [https://perma.cc/T75C-J787].
141 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
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hearing officers have gone to college and possess the requisite knowledge to be on
the hearing committee, either through formal education or experience.142 Some
colleges offer sensitivity training, although more can be done to ensure that all
actors in the reporting process, from initial reporters to hearing officers, receive
training on how to respond adequately to those who formally file complaints.143
However, in providing sensitivity training for those who adjudicate sexual miscon-
duct cases, colleges “must ensure that their sensitivity toward the complainant does
not infringe on the respondent’s right to a fair and impartial investigation, which is
often the crux of subsequent claims brought by respondents.”144
Training on alcohol use in sexual misconduct cases also shows how hearing pro-
fessionals understand consent. Unlike jurors’ predispositions to discount a victim’s
allegations based on the victim’s level of intoxication, hearing professionals are trained
to focus on the issue of consent in light of the effects of intoxication.145 In fact, hearing
professionals are likely taught that the “[u]se of alcohol or other drugs will never
function as a defense for any behavior that violates [sexual misconduct] policy.”146
In evaluating consent, hearing officers are likely taught that a violation of policy
may occur when one party engages in sexual activity “with someone who one
should know to be—or based on the circumstances should reasonably have known
to be—mentally or physically incapacitated” by alcohol or drug use.147 While this
may be substantially similar to jury instructions in the same subject matter, hearing
officers are trained on this prior to being confronted with the facts and circum-
stances.148 Therefore, this training and education only serves to benefit all parties in
a college sexual misconduct hearing.
HANDBOOK, POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION ADMINISTRATORS, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/man
agement/postsecondary-education-administrators.htm [https://perma.cc/26P3-YEQ5] (last
modified Apr. 13, 2018).
142 Id.
143 See Heather M. Karjane et al., Campus Sexual Assault: How America’s Institutions
of Higher Education Respond ix (Oct. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/196676.pdf [https://perma.cc/36WU-L79H] (explaining, via a range
of statistics, that those who are most likely to hear about an assault first are often the ones
overlooked in colleges’ training programs).
144 Ariel Sullivan, Illegal Procedure? Title IX and Sexual Assault, NEW ENG. J. OF HIGHER
EDUC. (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.nebhe.org/thejournal/illegal-procedure-title-ix-and-sexual
-assault/ [https://perma.cc/3JFU-LUX5].
145 See Karjane et al., supra note 143, at 73 (describing training at Lewis & Clark College
which includes the issue of consent relating to alcohol and drug use.).
146 Brett A. Sokolow et al., ATIXA Gender-Based and Sexual Misconduct Model Policy
1, 12 (2015), https://www.atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ATIXA-Model
-Policy-041715.pdf [https://perma.cc/W37V-2F59].
147 Id. at 11.
148 See generally id. (providing a set of policies intended to clearly define community
expectations).
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The investigative model used by colleges when approaching sexual misconduct
claims protects due process at every stage of the proceeding because it sets forth a
realm of guidance for hearing officers when it comes to weighing the use of drugs
or alcohol in these cases.149 The investigative model teaches hearing officers that:
The use of alcohol and/or drugs by either party will not diminish
the responding party’s responsibility. On the other hand, alcohol
and/or drug use is likely to affect the reporting party’s memory
and, therefore, may affect the resolution of the reported miscon-
duct. A reporting party must either remember the alleged incident
or have sufficient circumstantial evidence, physical evidence
and/or witnesses to prove that policy was violated. If the report-
ing party does not remember the circumstances of the alleged
incident, it may not be possible to impose sanctions on the re-
sponding party without further corroborating information.150
C. Use of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard Is Appropriate
As mentioned previously in this Note, critics who oppose the required use of the
preponderance of the evidence standard often decry it as the “lowest” standard of
proof, lamenting that it is not appropriate for such grave cases of misconduct with
severe, long-lasting consequences.151 This implicit skepticism of administrator exper-
tise forms much of the criticism surrounding the use of the preponderance standard,
believing it to be abstract, loosely applied, and, frankly, “easy” to convict.152
Hearing officers are more prone to have an empirical understanding of the
standard of proof required because they have used it traditionally in all student
disciplinary cases, not just those related to sexual misconduct, which allows them
to have a wider perspective on what a preponderance of the evidence calls for and
how to weigh the facts in each case accordingly.153
Despite what the 2017 rescindment letter and critics of the Dear Colleague
Letter allege, over eighty percent of schools were using the preponderance standard
149 See id. at 22–23 (answering the most commonly asked questions concerning a uni-
versity’s sexual misconduct procedures, including a section on drugs and alcohol).
150 Id. at 22.
151 See supra Section II.A.
152 See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
153 Cf. Chris Loschiavo & Jennifer L. Waller, The Preponderance of Evidence Standard:
Use In Higher Education Campus Conduct Processes, ASSOC. FOR STUD. CONDUCT ADMIN.,
https://www.theasca.org/files/The%20Preponderance%20of%20Evidence%20Standard.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7XTA-7DEP] (discussing that because the preponderance of the evidence
standard is applied in all student conduct violations, hearing officers are well-versed in
applying it).
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before required to do so.154 In addition, research shows that the preponderance of the
evidence standard is not really so different in practice than the clear and convincing
standard.155 Those that argue for the higher standard of proof—clear and convincing—
for sexual misconduct cases must first understand that hearing officers may not end
up seeing the slightly different nuances between the preponderance and clear and
convincing standards, which are both less than beyond a reasonable doubt.156 When
it comes to applying these standards of proof, the rationale for the committee’s find-
ings may end up with the same justification.157
Moreover, raising the standard to clear and convincing is inherently inequitable
because the balance starts more in favor of acquittal rather than beginning the
inquiry fifty-fifty.158 Thus, the preponderance of the evidence standard is most
appropriate for disciplinary hearings because it is well-understood and applied in a
more even-handed way than a higher standard.
D. A Practical and Effective Training Program Safeguards Due Process While
Ensuring Victim Protection
To demonstrate how a college can implement a practical training system, a
research team conducted a case study of Lewis & Clark College in order to study
how institutions of higher education respond to the issue of sexual assault.159 The
study evaluated the College’s investigative model, training and education protocol,
and hearing procedures to evaluate how the College confronts sexual misconduct.160
154 See Karjane et al., supra note 143, at 122; Jake New, College Leaders Discuss Future
of Title IX, Sexual Assault Prevention Efforts, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 26, 2017, 3:00 PM),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/26/college-leaders-discuss-future-title-ix
-sexual-assault-prevention-efforts [https://perma.cc/J2ZK-8UHN] (“The majority of colleges
were already using the standard prior to the Dear Colleague letter.”).
155 Brett A. Sokolow, ATIXA Guide to Choosing Between Preponderance of the Evidence
v. Clear and Convincing Evidence 3 (2017), https://atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads
/2017/09/ATIXA-Guide-to-Choosing-Between-Preponderance-of-the-Evidence-v.-Clear-and
-Convincing-Evidence-9.22.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8BS-TS3P].
156 See generally Amy Chmielewski, Defending the Preponderance of the Evidence
Standard in College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, 1 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 150 (2013)
(describing the clear and convincing standard as “the most difficult to define,” and discussing
how courts themselves vary in their interpretations of the standard).
157 See Sokolow, supra note 155, at 3 (reasoning that the “vast majority of decisions
would actually remain the same if the standard changed, both because of the amount of
evidence available in many cases (many decisions are already based on evidence that exceeds
[preponderance of the evidence]) and because many college decision-makers are administer-
ing reasonable findings regardless of the standard of proof elaborated by policy”).
158 See Chmielewski, supra note 156, at 155 (“Use of the preponderance standard for civil
rights violations indicates the intention . . . to assess alleged discriminatory conduct under
a standard that does not privilege the defendant’s word over the complainant’s word.”).
159 See Karjane et al., supra note 143, at 71.
160 See id. at 74–77.
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A summary of this case study will show that this comprehensive program can be
replicated at universities across the United States, leading to safer campuses and
fairer disciplinary processes.
At the time the study was conducted in 2001, Lewis & Clark College was a
small liberal arts college in Portland, Oregon, with a small graduate school and law
school.161 Nearly two-thirds of students live on campus, and the College has a two-
year on-campus residency requirement.162 The college’s residence life staff receive
training on how to discuss sexual assault with students and respond appropriately
to incidents if and when they are reported.163 According to the study, “[a] variety of
programs are offered each year focusing on prevention and more generally on
respect and tolerance.”164
After complaints are reported, sexual misconduct complaints are “heard in
designated adjudication boards with staff who have been trained to hear and respond
to these cases with sensitivity.”165 The College created a Sexual Assault Response
Network made up of student life and mental health professionals, all of whom
“receive comprehensive training on issues relating to sexual assault, including
definitions of sexual assault and consent, the role alcohol may play in sexual assaults,
and characteristics of Rape Trauma Syndrome. Faculty and staff receive training on
the policy and on how to refer students who disclose assaults . . . .”166
The College’s adjudication procedures include a formal review of the investiga-
tion by a “specially appointed Sexual Misconduct Review Board, composed solely of
administrators and staff members who have little student contact,”167 and who receive
“comprehensive training, including sensitivity to sexual assault victims; characteris-
tics of Rape Trauma Syndrome; myths and facts about sexual assault; sensitivity to
race, sexual orientation, and sex of individuals; and appropriate standards of proof.”168
Both the responding and reporting parties may object to the membership of the
Board if the coordinator is convinced that impartiality may be at issue.169
When a case moves to adjudication, the Board convenes a private meeting,
which is audio-recorded.170 If the victim is unable to present his or her case, a col-
lege administrator may present the case on his or her behalf and call relevant
witnesses.171 The accused then has the opportunity to present his or her case too.172
161 Id. at 71.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 72.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 73.
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Hearing officers may ask questions throughout the hearing, and the audio recording
may be played back for the hearing committee.173 In terms of cross-examination,
neither party may directly question each other during the hearing, but can submit
questions to the Board for clarification.174 Following the hearing and after receiving
notice of the Board’s findings, both the reporting and responding party may appeal
the outcome only based on evidence of “bias of [the] adjudicator(s), new evidence,
procedural irregularity, and/or inappropriate sanction(s).”175
It is important to note that this case study was conducted a decade before the
Dear Colleague Letter was released, showing that not all colleges were prone to be
caught off guard by the Department of Education’s groundbreaking directives.176
Most importantly, this case study shows that colleges are capable of establishing and
operating an organized and effective disciplinary process that is run by and in
conformity with best practices to protect the rights of both the reporting and re-
sponding parties.
IV. EXPOSURE TO CASES AND EXPERIENCE AS IMPACTING FINAL OUTCOME
Jurors often experience emotional trauma as a result of their role as triers of fact
in cases involving criminal violence, sexual trauma, and other particularly brutal
acts.177 It follows that exposure to crimes of a violent nature is a significant obstacle
for decision-makers when reaching an outcome formed by rational, evidence-based
reasoning.178 Exposure to evidence in certain kinds of forms can have a spurious
impact on how jurors perceive crime in general, which can impact their ability to
make fair, impartial decisions.179 Trials laden with various forms of evidence expose
jurors to the carnal nature of these crimes and can cause jurors to lower the standard
of proof, resulting in an inadvertent, predisposed alignment with the prosecution.180
173 Id. (“The hearing board members are allowed to ask questions at any point during the
hearing and may recall any witnesses to clarify or challenge statements made during the
hearing.”).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 76.
176 See supra Section I.B.
177 See Andrew G. Ferguson, The Trauma of Jury Duty, ATLANTIC (May 17, 2015), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/the-trauma-of-jury-duty/393479/ [https://perma
.cc/9ZRL-FDCU] (“Jurors internalize both the difficulty of deciding another’s fate, as well
as the emotional toll of bearing witness to tragic events.”).
178 See Saul M. Kassin & David A. Garfield, Blood and Guts: General and Trial-Specific
Effects of Videotaped Crime Scenes on Mock Jurors, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1459
(1991) (finding that exposure to the crime scene impacted the jurors’ biases and the standard
of proof they applied to the final outcome).
179 See id. at 1468–69.
180 See id. at 1468.
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A. Problems Related to Exposure or Experience with Sex-Based Crimes
While the psychology is unique as to each respective juror’s mental health, one
factor that contributes to juror trauma is the lack of exposure to these types of crimes
and behaviors. Because jurors are rarely exposed to the brutality of sex-based crimes,
they are more likely to base their decisions on their emotional response to the evi-
dence presented.181 Added to this is the impact on decision-making from a juror’s
personal understanding of sexual assault and harassment,182 where, for example,
“stronger personal beliefs in guilt [are] significantly associated with . . . personal
knowledge of sexual assault victims.”183
As mentioned before in this Note,184 jurors bring to the deliberation room popular,
socially constructed prejudices pertaining to sex-based crimes, where the “[a]ccep-
tance of traditional gender role norms for men and women influences tolerance of
rape,” ultimately leading to a greater acceptance of rape myths in general.185 Indeed,
“rape mythology persists, and studies reveal that rape myths insidiously infect the
minds of jurors, judges, and others who deal with rape and its victims.”186 These
types of prejudices are often ascertained through personal experience.187 More
specifically, beliefs as to guilt or innocence can be associated with personal knowl-
edge of the circumstances surrounding these crimes, whether that knowledge per-
tains to commission of the crime, being or knowing a victim, or having previously
played a part in the adjudication process.188
B. Voir Dire as an Impractical Solution to Exposure-Related Problems
Because jurors are so significantly influenced by their exposure (or lack of
exposure) to sex-based crimes, courts look to voir dire to “identify and remove
prospective jurors who are unable to serve fairly and impartially.”189 There are
181 See Taylor, supra note 121, at 6.
182 See id. at 2.
183 Id. at 4.
184 See supra Section III.A.
185 Sarah Ben-David & Ofra Schneider, Rape Perceptions, Gender Role Attitudes, and
Victim-Perpetrator Acquaintance, 53 SEX ROLES 385, 387 (2005) (discussing the impact of
the level of relationship between the victim and perpetrator of the rape experience by others).
186 State v. Robinson, 431 N.W.2d 165, 172 n.7 (Wis. 1988) (quoting Toni M. Massaro,
Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Impli-
cations for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 404 (1985)).
187 See Mary A. Gowan & Raymond A. Zimmerman, Impact of Ethnicity, Gender, and
Previous Experience on Juror Judgments in Sexual Harassment Cases, 26 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL., 596 (1996) (examining the influence of gender on sexual harassment cases, with
results indicating that gender and prior experience with sexual harassment affect the outcomes
in such cases).
188 See Taylor, supra note 121, at 4.
189 GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, NAT’L CTR. FOR
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various goals of voir dire in cases involving sex-based crimes that could serve to
cure the defects posed by the aforementioned exposure-related problems; namely, to
combat rape myth acceptance, to prepare the jury for difficult and graphic terminol-
ogy and evidence, and “to use a jurors’ life experiences to educate other jurors . . . .”190
However, “[t]raditional voir dire questions regarding jurors’ abilities to follow the
law, assess witness credibility, understand the burden of proof, and other common
areas of inquiry might not sufficiently address potential jurors’ emotional reactions
to sexual assault cases.”191 Notwithstanding this difficulty, voir dire generally serves
as an effective method to weed out potential juror bias and control for jurors’ dif-
fering experiences with sex crimes.
However, voir dire in practice may not overcome these obstacles because it is
not conducted uniformly in all courts, leading to a diverse array of outcomes
depending on the jurisdiction.192 For example, the mechanics of how voir dire is
conducted, such as who does the questioning, are different depending on jurisdic-
tion.193 In jurisdictions where the attorney, rather than the judge, conducts voir dire,
juror responses “are generally more candid because jurors are less intimidated and
less likely to respond to voir dire questions with socially desirable answers.”194
Voir dire as a multi-purpose aspect of pretrial proceedings is not uniform either.195
Many courts are pushing back against an all-encompassing, multi-purpose use of
voir dire.196 While much of the onus to identify, cure, or dismiss highly prejudicial
juror bias through voir dire is on the prosecution, “[a]n increasing number of juris-
dictions are curtailing the ability of prosecutors . . . to conduct meaningful voir dire
of jurors in the name of ‘judicial economy.’”197
Indeed, voir dire in some jurisdictions is conducted by judges, who argue that
“attorneys waste too much time and unduly invade jurors’ privacy by asking
questions that are only tangentially related to the issues likely to arise at trial.”198
Such inconsistencies among courts and within courts casts doubt on the use of voir
dire as an effective method to ensure, consistently, that each and every trial for sex-
based crimes is free from or minimally impacted by pervasive and harmful myths
about sexual assault and harassment.
ST. CTS., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPEN-
DIUM REPORT 27 (2007), http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS
/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx [https://perma.cc/NDQ7-UCZK].
190 Mallios & Meisner, supra note 120, at 2.
191 Id.
192 See MIZE, HANNAFORD-AGOR & WATERS, supra note 189, at 27.
193 See id.
194 Id. at 28 (citing Susan E. Jones, Judge Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire, 11 L. &
HUMAN BEHAV. 131 (1987)).
195 See Mallios & Meisner, supra note 120, at 2.
196 See id.
197 Id.
198 MIZE, HANNAFORD-AGOR & WATERS, supra note 189, at 28.
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C. Bias on Student Conduct Panels Is Better Controlled and Removed
The problems with juror impartiality due to lack of exposure to sex-based crimes
are largely nonexistent with student conduct committees because the committee is
composed of members who have prior experience adjudicating these types of cases.
While hearing bias is still a concern for students, it can be controlled in this setting
more than in the courtroom because the college can handpick who serves, rather
than having to narrow down their selection from a large, randomized pool. Exactly
who the college decides to appoint to be on these hearings varies among institu-
tions.199 “Some designate specific employees to the task, while others appoint outside
lawyers and judges to serve.”200 Although they choose their committee members
from a narrower pool than courts, “[c]olleges have considerable flexibility when ap-
pointing hearing officers to decide the cases.”201
However, colleges must adhere to minimal procedural standards with regards
to ensuring an unbiased hearing panel. Courts have recognized that “an impartial and
independent adjudicator ‘is a fundamental ingredient of procedural due process.’”202
At the same time, hearing officers are “entitled to a presumption of honesty and inte-
grity, absent a showing of actual bias.”203 This was tested in Gomes v. University of
Maine System.204 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the chairwoman of the conduct
committee was biased due to her involvement with rape response and victim advo-
cate programs, and that plaintiffs were denied the right to voir dire members of the
Hearing Committee.205
With regards to the bias alleged due to the chairwoman’s involvement with
sexual assault victim advocacy, the court noted the difference between one’s capacity
to adjudicate sexual assault claims based on this activity and one who is able to
render a neutral decision.206 The court found that the plaintiffs did not show a
“genuine issue of material fact as to the Hearing Committee’s or [the chairwoman]’s
impartiality,”207 and the evidence showed that the committeewoman’s chairmanship
was one capable of rendering an otherwise neutral decision.208
199 See Jake New, Victims, Advocates Worry About Bias in Campus Hearings, INSIDE




202 Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting the trial court, Gorman
v. Univ. of R.I., 646 F. Supp. 799, 810 (D.R.I. 1986)).
203 Hill v. Bd. of Trs. of Mich. State Univ., 182 F. Supp. 2d 621, 628 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
204 365 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D. Me. 2005).
205 Id. at 29.
206 Id. at 31–32.
207 Id. at 31.
208 Id. at 32.
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Regarding the claim that the students were denied the right to voir dire, the court
noted that, although not required, some colleges may allow students to conduct voir
dire or to challenge any individual committee member’s appointment “for cause.”209
Either allowance is consistent with due process so long as it conforms to the col-
lege’s policy.210 In weighing the difference between allowing students to conduct
voir dire or to challenge the committee’s members “for cause,” the Gomes court
stated that:
Allowing challenges for cause, but not voir dire, reduces the risk
the committee hearing will be transformed into a full blown trial.
On the other hand, if the parties are aware of reasons that would
disqualify a committee member, they are allowed to bring them
forward. Striking this balance, the University has not violated
the due process clause.211
The remedies available to students to conduct voir dire or make a “for cause”
challenge to certain members of their conduct hearing committee allow for an
enhanced participation in the selection process, even more than a defendant’s control
over members of the jury during voir dire. As mentioned before, conduct committee
members who are trained on how to view evidence, understand and minimize gender
biases, and approach the issues with sensitivity are less likely to harbor substantially
prejudicial beliefs toward one party in favor of the other.212 With the added security
of handpicking members to serve on the committee and allowing students to chal-
lenge membership “for cause,” conduct committees are substantially more likely to
be fair and impartial to all parties in sexual misconduct cases than juries are to all
parties in criminal trials.
D. Outcomes: Broad Range of Jury Punishment Versus Limited College Sanctions
As mentioned previously, critics of the Dear Colleague Letter lamented the
required use of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof, arguing that
the stakes are too high for the accused to be subjected to our nation’s “lowest legal
standard.”213 This invokes the idea that the standard of proof has a negative relation
to the outcome of the case, where the university has less to prove while the accused
has much to lose. Understanding the idea that due process is intrinsically tied to




212 See supra Section III.D (discussing the case study of Lewis & Clark College).
213 See supra Section II.A.
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range of outcomes pales in comparison to the wide array of options given to the
American jury in criminal cases for sexual offenses.
The United States Constitution requires that the government must follow certain
procedures before it can deprive individuals of their “life, liberty, or property.”214
Due process is understood in two parts: substantive and procedural, where the
former “concerns whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away
a person’s life, liberty or property,” and the latter “concerns whether the government
has followed adequate procedures in taking away a person’s life, liberty or prop-
erty.”215 Because this Note is concerned with procedural due process, it is important
to discuss punishment as a component of both the criminal process and the college
disciplinary hearing.
The broad range of punitive punishment in criminal law stands in contrast to a
limited scope of college conduct sanctions, an aspect that significantly distinguishes
these processes from one another. While only a handful of states permit juries to
sentence convicted criminals,216 the college conduct hearing committee nearly always
decides both the findings and outcomes in sexual misconduct cases.217
Even before jurors are selected to serve, they “must be committed to an unbi-
ased consideration of the entire punishment range.”218 This is practically challenging
because the wide range of punishment for certain crimes can span in some cases from
probation to death.219 This overwhelmingly vast array of potential punishments can
create an additional layer of bias, such as when jurors fail to consider statutory mini-
mum sentences for crimes they find personally reprehensible.220 The Texas Court of
214 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. Although what is meant by “life” interests may be self-
evident, “liberty” and “property” interests are less clear. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972) (finding that a professor was not deprived of a property right when he was not
rehired after one academic year); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (holding
the deprivation of liberty in a system where a police officer can designate an individual as
a public drunk).
215 Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 871, 871 (2000).
216 See Melissa Carrington, Applying Apprendi to Jury Sentencing: Why State Felony Jury
Sentencing Threatens the Right to a Jury Trial, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1360 (2011)
(acknowledging jury sentencing systems in Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas,
and Virginia).
217 See Ronald B. Standler, Legal Right to Have an Attorney at College Disciplinary
Hearings in the USA 6 (Apr. 9, 2011), http://www.rbs2.com/eatty.pdf [https://perma.cc
/C3SM-97QV] (“Disciplinary decisions that result in suspension or expulsion of the student
are made after fact-finding by jurors at a hearing on campus. Modern (i.e., since about 1970)
practice is that disciplinary hearings on campuses use a jury that includes at least several
students (and sometimes also several professors.”)).
218 John Floyd & Billy Sinclair, Defending Against Juror Bias in Sex Crimes, HG.ORG,
https://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=21208 [https://perma.cc/JBS9-PEFS] (last visited Oct. 15,
2018).
219 See id.
220 See id. (discussing how jurors who are confronted with the possibility of sentencing
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Appeals weighed in on this issue in Williams v. State221 and Jordan v. State,222 finding
as a matter of law that a juror is biased if he or she refuses to consider a certain punish-
ment.223 These cases show that it is neither realistic nor practical to ask juries to
disassociate the alleged criminal conduct from the potential punishment; after all, who
knows how many jurors, unlike the ones in Williams and Jordan, remain silent about
their reservations during voir dire and after selection. Is it realistic to rely on jurors
to be forthcoming about such deeply entrenched beliefs about crime and punishment?
Thankfully, the university disciplinary process does not pretend to put adminis-
trators in such a position. “Of the schools with a disciplinary process, the most
common sanctions employed by a school [for sexual misconduct] are expulsion
(84.3 percent), suspension (77.3 percent), probation (63.1 percent), censure (56.3
percent), restitution (47.8 percent), and loss of privileges (35.7 percent).”224 How-
ever, it goes without saying that expulsion has a significant effect on a student’s
reputation, and many individuals who have been accused are pursuing legal action
to clear their names.225 While suspension or expulsion is a “grevious loss”226 for the
accused student, “the [Supreme] Court has rejected the notion that the importance
of the benefit (here a college degree) determines whether it is property for the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”227 Still, critics of university disciplinary
committees maintain that “[o]nce the state has chosen to grant students a property
right by admitting them to a public institution of higher education, it cannot revoke
this right arbitrarily or unfairly.”228
Although a jury’s decision often results in whether an individual is labeled a sex
offender for life, a university disciplinary committee has no such equivalent. Critics
argue that a notation on a student’s academic transcript amounts to such registry, but
the facts do not support this idea.229 In a survey conducted by The American
a child rapist to a minimum term of probation often will not consider that as a punishment
because it is already too lenient in their eyes).
221 773 S.W.2d 525, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (holding that a juror who “cannot con-
sider the minimum five year sentence as a possible punishment for the lesser included offense
of murder in a capital murder prosecution” is biased as a matter of law).
222 635 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (holding that the defendant can bring a chal-
lenge for cause against a juror who could not consider probation in a capital murder case).
223 Id. at 523; Williams, 773 S.W.2d at 536.
224 Karjane et al., supra note 143, at xii.
225 See T. Rees Shapiro, Expelled For Sex Assault, Young Men Are Filing More Lawsuits to
Clear Their Names, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/educa
tion/expelled-for-sex-assault-young-men-are-filing-more-lawsuits-to-clear-their-names/2017
/04/27/c2cfb1d2-0d89-11e7-9b0d-d27c98455440_story.html [https://perma.cc/2L9Y-S8S4].
226 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
227 Tamara Rice Lave, READY, FIRE, AIM: How Universities Are Failing the Constitution
in Sexual Assault Cases, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637, 664 (2016).
228 FIRE’s Guide to Due Process, supra note 16.
229 See Tyler Kingkade, Colleges Take A Step Towards Including Sexual Assault Punish-
ments on Transcripts, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2016, 4:50 PM), https://www.huffington
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Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, “[n]inety-five percent
of respondents said their school excludes minor disciplinary violations from academic
transcripts and eighty-five percent said they do not include a student’s ‘ineligibility
to re-enroll due to major disciplinary violations.’”230 Without this, students found
responsible can transfer to other schools without preclusion.231 Although there is no
statutory requirement to denote this on a transcript,232 failing to share behavioral
histories of students seeking to transfer to other campuses gives cause for concern.233
As a result, some states have begun to include such information in response to
higher education professionals groups and victim’s rights advocates.234 As devastat-
ing, embarrassing, and frustrating as it may be, expulsion from a university for sexual
misconduct pales in comparison to the long-term impact of being found guilty by
a jury for the same conduct.
V. JURY SERVICE VERSUS CONDUCT PROFESSIONALS’ CAREER
Impartiality and fairness as required for due process can be threatened by
whether decision-makers are voluntarily or obligatorily involved in the process. This
Part will conduct a comparison between jury service as a civil duty and student




231 See Tyler Kingkade, Lawmakers Consider How to Address Sexual Assault Offenders
Transferring Colleges, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 10, 2014, 3:42 PM), https://www.huffing
tonpost.com/2014/12/10/sexual-assault-transferring_n_6297176.html [https://perma.cc
/RM8N-J6S7].
232 But see Tyler Kingkade, New York Poised To Become Second State Requiring Sexual
Assault Offenses On Transcripts, HUFFINGTON POST (June 18, 2015, 12:01 PM), https://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/18/new-york-sexual-assault-transcripts_n_7606196.html [https://
perma.cc/L3YM-42KP]; Jake New, Requiring a Red Flag, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 10, 2015,
3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/10/states-requiring-colleges-note
-sexual-assault-responsibility-student-transcripts [https://perma.cc/EYZ9-EKWG].
233 ASSOCIATION OF STUDENT CONDUCT ADMINISTRATORS, STUDENT CONDUCT ADMIN-
ISTRATION & TRANSCRIPT NOTATION: ISSUES AND PRACTICES, http://www.theasca.org/files
/Best%20Practices/Transcript%20Notation%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8M7T-7LKT].
234 See Tyler Kingkade, Students Punished For Sexual Assault Should Have Transcripts
Marked, Title IX Group Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2015, 4:17 PM), https://www
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sexual-assault-transcripts-atixa_us_560420d0e4b0fde8b0d18d42
[https://perma.cc/R3J6-K7KL] (“ATIXA, or the Association of Title IX Administrators, called
on all colleges to make it a policy to include clear notations on transcripts if a student is dis-
missed for sexual violence.”); Kingkade, supra note 231 (“Peg Langhammer, executive director
of the Rhode Island sexual assault trauma center Day One, said Congress should put something
in a bill related to students who want to transfer after being found guilty of sexual misconduct.”).
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chance of receiving an impartial outcome from those who are not “burdened” by
their role as trier of fact.
A. Jury Duty as a Financial Obligation
Citizens who are eligible to be a juror are called to serve “one of the most im-
portant civic duties [an individual] can perform.”235 However, jury duty often carries
negative connotations, being generally regarded as boring, time-consuming, and an
underpaid obligation.236 Then again, there are those who find jury service empower-
ing, being able to influence an outcome while learning more about the communities
in which they live, the problems faced in society, and how best to remedy them.237
Yet, “citizens who are not at all eager to be on juries, just as those who are overly
eager to be on juries, may not be the best people to have deciding your case.”238
Although not always contested or dreaded, jury service often imposes a burden-
some restraint on the average American citizen, leading to employment hardships
as well as significant and lasting mental health problems as a result of their
service.239 However, jurors are permitted to be excused if service would result in
hardship and even qualify for exemption.240 It should be noted that exemption is not
the same as disqualification: the latter prohibits “individuals who do not meet the
[statutory] qualification criteria . . . from serving,” and the former “provides individ-
uals with a statutory right to decline to serve if summonsed.”241 While statutes may
differ as to what kind of hardship qualifies, nearly all jurisdictions recognize
financial hardship as an excuse not to serve on jury duty.242
235 Jury Service, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury
-service [https://perma.cc/WG7P-Q5RD] (last accessed Feb. 17, 2018).
236 See Kevin Drum, Why We All Hate Jury Duty, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 27, 2012, 3:59 PM),
http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/02/why-we-all-hate-jury-duty/ [https://perma
.cc/6FCK-B5WR].
237 See Sabrina Ali, Why Do Some People Love Jury Duty?, QUORA: SLATE (May 21,
2016, 7:06 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/quora/2016/05/21/why_do_some_people_love
_jury_duty.html [https://perma.cc/7JLF-LLKU].
238 David M. Sams, Tess M.S. Neal & Stanley L. Brodsky, Avoiding Jury Duty: Psychological
and Legal Perspectives, 25 THE JURY EXPERT 1, 1 (2013), http://www.thejuryexpert.com
/wp-content/uploads/JuryExpert_1301_AvoidingJuryDuty.pdf [https://perma.cc/G855-K6BK].
239 See generally Anne Reed, Juror Stress: The Hidden Influence of the Jury Experience,
21 THE JURY EXPERT 70 (2009), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/05/juror-stress-the-hid
den-influence-of-the-jury-experience [https://perma.cc/U8LG-AUDK] (discussing the multiple
sources of juror stress and the effects of juror stress).
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Employment complaints, as part of hardship dismissals, account for a large
number of dismissed jurors, with more than half of summoned jurors in some courts
being excused for financial hardship as a result of missing work for jury service.243
Of the jurors that remain, there is the risk that their personal financial concerns will
taint the verdict.244 At the same time, “[p]eople on the margins of society tend to be
more sympathetic with victims bringing suit, and excluding them on hardship grounds
can disadvantage plaintiffs.”245 Thus, financial hardship imposes a significant hurdle
for both parties, where verdicts can be affected by jurors who are overly mindful of
their own financial situations.
B. Psychological Stress of Jury Duty
While financial stress before trial even begins is influential on a prospective
juror’s potential decision-making, the stress of the trial itself plays a significant role
in how jurors decide their verdict. The effects of juror stress as a result of exposure
to graphic images and crimes are well-documented.246 The long-term impact of this
experience is substantial; in some cases, jurors have reported avoiding certain loca-
tions or triggers that remind them of their jury service.247 One study found that
twenty-nine percent of jurors reported specifically avoiding doing things that would
remind them of their time on the jury.248
The confines of jury duty and its imposed lifestyle restrictions lead to further
mental stress. Jurors are told not to speak about the case outside of the trial with
anyone, even other jurors.249 This type of isolation can be difficult for people to cope
243 See Carol J. Williams, Weighed Down by Recession Woes, Jurors Are Becoming Dis-
gruntled, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/15/local/la-me
-reluctant-jurors15-2010feb15 [https://perma.cc/RK4R-RQ3X] (“Money woes inflicted by
the recession have spurred more hardship claims, especially by those called for long cases,
say jury consultants and courtroom administrators.”).
244 See id. (“[I]t’s also risky . . . to force people into jury service that will cut deeply into
their paychecks.”)
245 Id.
246 See Reed, supra note 239; Stanley M. Kaplan & Carolyn Winget, The Occupational
Hazards of Jury Duty, 20 BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCH. L. 325 (1992), http://jaapl.org/content
/jaapl/20/3/325.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BUZ-SUDU] (discussing the psychological and
physical effects on jurors in four criminal trials).
247 See Noelle Robertson, Graham Davies & Alice Nettleingham, Vicarious Traumatisa-
tion as a Consequence of Jury Service, 48 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 2 (2009) (“Symptoms
shown . . . include excessive arousal and irritability, behaviors to avoid reminders of traumatic
material, emotional numbing, and impaired memory for the original events . . . .”).
248 Ruth Lee Johnson, The Hidden Horrors of Jury Duty: Jurors Suffer Long After Trial
Has Ended, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/so
-sue-me/201503/the-hidden-horrors-jury-duty [https://perma.cc/N3H6-2D72].
249 See Robertson, Davies, & Nettleingham, supra note 247, at 3 (“We were given clear
instructions not to talk to anyone. I wanted desperately to talk to anybody, but I couldn’t, not
even my husband.”).
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with what they are experiencing.250 Additionally, jurors often perceive their role as
having an overwhelming responsibility to make the right decision, recognizing “that
they have the duty to drastically change the outcome of the life of one or more
human beings. They fear making the wrong decision, and living with the guilt.”251
C. Juror Stress as It Impacts Impartiality and the Ultimate Outcome
For those jurors who have not wholly made their decision, despite others having
done so, the risk of conforming to the majority’s opinion increases when the afore-
mentioned financial hardship is a concern, or simply out of social peer pressure.
Research has shown that minority jurors, or so-called “holdouts,” conform to the
majority not “based on informational influence (i.e., because they are actually
persuaded), but because of normative influence (i.e., because of social pressure).”252
Juries may also rush a judgment based on perceived time pressure to wrap up
a long trial.253 While there are no limits on deliberation time, jurors may feel pressure
to reach a quick decision “because of [an] upcoming holiday . . . or finish before the
weekend.”254 Research shows that “decisions made under time pressure are not as
sound as those made under less pressure due to factors such as greater reliance on
heuristic reasoning.”255
When jurors find it difficult to reach their decision, a judge may offer an
instruction to send a deadlocked jury back to the deliberation room.256 However, this
may make jurors feel coerced into changing their votes, and even lead those in the
majority to exert more pressure on jurors in the minority. Many jurors perceive the
judge to be the superior authority,257 so they often cave to what they believe the
judge wants or expects. Thus, although a judge’s recommendation that a deadlocked
jury continue to deliberate may be in the immediate best interests of both parties—in
that the defendant may hold out hope that the jury will end in deadlock and the
250 Johnson, supra note 248 (“For the length of the trial, they’re having to just internalize
everything that they’re hearing and they’re seeing.” (quoting Sonia Chopra, Consultant for
the National Jury Project)).
251 Id.
252 Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Bornstein, Do Juror Pressures Lead to Unfair Verdicts?,





256 Id. (“The U.S. Supreme Court has approved instructions ordering a deadlocked jury
to continue deliberations, often referred to as a ‘dynamite charge.’”).
257 See David Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social
Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 246 (1981) (“The judge obviously has the highest status
of anyone in the courtroom. He is physically separated from and elevated above everyone
else, and is addressed by jurors and attorneys alike as ‘your honor.’”).
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prosecution will hope that the holdouts will acquiesce to the majority—the effect of
a judge’s order to do so may produce an outcome void of informative reasoning.
In contrast to the consensus that jury duty is a cumbersome obligation, student
conduct professionals are hired to do student conduct case work and voluntarily
choose to do so as part of an aspirational career. Their full-time work focuses on the
student conduct process, ensuring that it serves an inherently educational purpose
as well as one which benefits the college community.
D. Post-Verdict Rationales
Due process in criminal proceedings does not require that the defendant know
the factors taken into account by jurors when deliberating their outcome.258 In fact,
the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit “jurors from testifying as to what occurred
during deliberations, subject to certain exceptions that do not explicitly encompass
the presence of a biased or prejudiced juror.”259 The idea of keeping deliberations
strictly private to the jurors participating in them is to protect the integrity of the
decision-making process and insulate the triers of fact from any retaliation or
criticism for their reasoning after rendering the verdict.260 However, “[t]here is
nothing to prevent the jurors from discussing the case with others after the verdict.
In fact, many jurors have voluntarily revealed details of their deliberations, and
some have even conducted postverdict interviews and written books.”261
Although many colleges may choose to accept the same rationale for why de-
liberations are kept secretive, due process in university disciplinary proceedings also
does not require a written rationale explaining the decision-makers’ findings and how
they came about their decision.262 Hearing professionals are restricted even more than
jurors when it comes to post-trial disclosure of information related to the case.263 The
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) prohibits the improper disclosure
of “personally identifiable information” derived from education records, which includes
258 The Constitutional requirement is stated in the Sixth Amendment: “In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. See also FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee’s notes on 1974 enactment.
259 Amanda R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room . . . But
Should It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),
60 UCLA L. REV. 262, 262 (2012). See also FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
260 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee’s notes on 1974 enactment.
261 Wolin, supra note 259, at 294–95.
262 In Flaim v. Med. C. of Ohio, the Sixth Circuit held that “[a]n accused individual is gen-
erally not entitled to a statement of reasons for a decision against them, at least where the
reasons for the decision are obvious.” 418 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2005).
263 Although jurors may lawfully speak about the proceedings after the verdict is an-
nounced, legislation restricts education professionals from disclosing information. See Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(b)(1), (g)(b)(2)(A) (2017)
[hereinafter FERPA].
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student conduct records.264 In this regard, students who are found responsible for
violations of college policy are protected from public disclosure by members of the
committee which rendered the decision, although there are exceptions.265
In light of this, “[m]any colleges and universities provide for written findings
of fact or a written explanation of the reasoning behind the disciplinary panel’s
hearing, despite the state of the law.”266 However, a written statement of decision,
if given, must show facts sufficient to support the committee’s finding.267 Thus, the
accused can learn how the committee reached its conclusion, which can streamline
the process of appeal by helping the student understand what factors were consid-
ered in the decision and how they were weighed. Additionally, a written rationale
in the student’s file can be helpful to the student should he or she decide to transfer,
apply for graduate school, or face an employment background check. As exempli-
fied in the Lewis & Clark case study, effective training and procedural measures can
be put in place to ensure that the process remains transparent, and most of all, fair.268
CONCLUSION
Although she has taken a positive outlook, Laura Dunn maintains that “the ways
the university handled her report would have violated the principles set down in the
Dear Colleague Letter,” particularly with regard to the nine months it took for the
university to resolve her case as well as its use of a higher standard of proof to
evaluate her claims.269 But at what cost?
For some, it is an unacceptably high one: “one person denied due process is one
too many.”270 As critics of the Dear Colleague Letter found their rallying cry vindi-
cated at the highest level of government, the crux of their argument remains. However,
if universities operating under the Dear Colleague guidance would be sidestepping
constitutional rights enjoyed by and displayed at criminal courts for the same offense,
then a close examination of those courts ought to reveal an exquisite alternative: one
264 See FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g).
265 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (discussing exceptions allowing schools, sua sponte, to disclose
student records under certain circumstances).
266 FIRE’s Guide to Due Process, supra note 16.
267 For example, the Court of Appeals of Florida in Hardison v. Florida A&M University
reversed a disciplinary panel’s finding on the basis of the written findings, finding that the
facts reported in the written decision were insufficient to meet the applicable definition of
assault and battery. Hardison v. Fla. Agric. & Mech. Univ., 706 So. 2d 111, 112 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998).
268 See supra Section III.D.
269 Wilson, supra note 9.
270 Sophie Tatum, Devos Announces Review of Obama-Era Sexual Assault Guidance,
CNN (Sept. 7, 2017, 10:02 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/07/politics/betsy-devos-edu
cation-department-title-ix/index.html [https://perma.cc/76M7-D25A] (quoting Betsy DeVos
speaking at George Mason University).
248 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:213
that is ripe with procedural fairness, void of harmful bias, and consistent both in
theory and practice.
The reality is that a closer glance at American jury trials for sex-based crimes
may not provide satisfaction. American juries are often plagued by harmful stereo-
types about sex, culture, race, and gender.271 The jury system itself is replete with
risk: jurors are reluctant to serve,272 are affected in psychologically harmful ways,273
and are confronted with such a broad range of punishment that results in extreme
outcomes based on personal preference.274 In contrast, through sensitivity training
and programming, university disciplinary hearings are capable of being regulated
to diminish bias, support equitable solutions for all parties, and provide expertise on
how to view and weigh evidence properly.275
Universities, under Title IX, have an obligation to provide a safe environment
free from gender-based discrimination, and in accordance with this purpose, Title
IX must provide an equal opportunity to education for all.276 In comparing univer-
sity disciplinary hearings with American juries within the context of due process as
required by case law and formal OCR guidance, it becomes clearer that due process
is not under attack at colleges and universities.
271 See supra Section III.A.
272 See supra Section V.A.
273 See supra Section V.B.
274 See supra Section V.B.
275 See supra Section III.B.
276 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1986).
